completion discharge if the debtor has completed 'all payments under the plan,' [ § 1328(a) ], without an express requirement that such payments were made within five years." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that bankruptcy courts do have discretion to allow for a brief grace period for debtors to cure an arrearage.
QUESTION TWO: Whether there are specific factors for a bankruptcy court to consider when exercising discretion relating to granting a grace period. Id. at 823.
ANALYSIS:
The court relied on a previous bankruptcy court decision which identified four factors to consider: (1) the length of time to complete the plan?; (2) whether the debtor diligently made plan payments?; (3) the time elapsed since confirmation before dismissal is sought?; and "(4) If the plan cannot be completed on time due to a large prepetition claim, was the debtor culpable in failing to properly schedule the claim?" Id. at 832. The court stated that while those factors offered a helpful starting point, they do not account for certain additional factors the court deemed relevant, such as the "materiality of the default or whether allowing a cure would prejudice any creditors." Id. In addition, the court looked to case law and stated that other considerations include "any prejudice the plaintiff will suffer if the default is lifted, as well as the defaulting defendant's ability to present a meritorious defense, the excusability or culpability of the defendant's conduct, and the effectiveness of applying alternative sanctions." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that there are five factors a bankruptcy court should consider when deciding whether to allow for a grace period; First, "whether the debtor substantially complied with the plan, including the debtor's diligence in making prior payments." Id. at 832. Second, "the feasibility of completing the plan if permitted, including the length of time needed and amount of arrearage due." Id. Third, "whether allowing a cure would prejudice any creditors," and fourth "whether the debtor's conduct is excusable or culpable, taking into account the cause of the shortfall and the timeliness of notice to the debtor." Id. Finally, "the availability and relative equities of other remedies, including conversion and hardship discharge." Id.
Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017) QUESTION: " [W] hether and when medical expert testimony may be necessary to create a triable issue on the subjective prong of a deliberate indifference case." Id. at 535.
The court considered the subjective nature of the issue of indifference and how it can be proven through witness testimony as well as circumstantial evidence. Id. Additionally, " . . . when medical care is provided, [the court] presume [s] that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care." Id. Finally, " . . . the mere receipt of inadequate medical care does not itself amount to deliberate indifference-the defendant must also act with the requisite state of mind when providing that inadequate care." Id. Based on these factors in an adequacy of medical care case, " . . . as laymen, the jury would not be in a position to determine that the particular treatment or diagnosis fell below a professional standard of care." Id. at 536.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that " . . . medical expert testimony may be necessary in some adequacy of care cases when the propriety of a particular diagnosis or course of treatment would not be apparent to a layperson." Id. at 537. ANALYSIS: The court noted that the district court incorrectly applied 42 U.S. C. § 1988(a) to the Fair Housing Act. Id. The court concluded that both the statutory text and legislative history indicate § 1988(a) has always applied to designated statutes only, not including the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 106. The court further reasoned that this is an issue where a uniform federal common law rule is proper to fulfill the purpose of the statute. Id. at 109. Therefore, the court applied a common law rule of survival, allowing the survival of remedial but not penal claims. Id. The court further concluded that Congress intended for the Fair Housing Act to have broad remedial intent. Id. at 110.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that under the common law rule, Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party. Id. ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that "the special-technique regulation's plain language describes what the [Social Security Administration ('SSA')] must do." Id. at 661. The court noted that the SSA codifying the regulation process contradicts the argument that the SSA only wanted to offer decision makers nonbinding guidance because they went through the process of issuing binding guidance. Id. The court further reasoned that the weight of authority suggests that a "failure to properly document application of the special technique will rarely, if ever, be harmless because . . . it hinders judicial review." Id. at 662.
CONCLUSION:
The court held "that such an error does not automatically require remand, but that the error was not harmless on these facts." Id. at 657. The court reversed the district court's order and remanded to the ALJ "for appropriate review of [the claimant's] mental impairment. Id.
United States v. Maclaren, 866 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2017)
QUESTION: Whether a sexually dangerous defendant must "state with particularity 'the extent to which . . . Respondent's psychological/psychiatric condition has improved since he was committed ' and 'what, if anything, Respondent has done to meet the conditions of release specified in § 4248(d)(2)'" to succeed on a motion for a discharge hearing. Id. at 216 (internal citations omitted).
ANALYSIS:
The court noted that the controlling statute does not state what a defendant must demonstrate to succeed on his or her motion for a discharge hearing. Id. at 217. The court reasoned that it would be illogical to require identical evidentiary burdens for both the motion for a discharge hearing and the hearing itself when Congress only defined the evidentiary burdens applied at the hearing and did not suggest using identical burdens. Id. The court likened the procedural posture in a motion for a discharge hearing to a civil plaintiff attempting to overcome a motion to dismiss. Id.
CONCLUSION:
The 4th Circuit held that the plausibility-pleading framework should be applied while assessing a motion for a discharge hearing. Id. The court also held that a motion for a discharge hearing should be granted only "if the motion contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for discharge that is plausible on its face" and instructed courts to construe these facts "in the light most favorable to the detainee. Id. at 218. ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit reasoned that the "[p]laintiffs must plausibly allege with sufficient particularity" that the reason for the action was proffered in bad faith. Id. at 591. The court stated that the plaintiffs displayed more than enough findings that the true purpose behind EO-2 is an anti-Muslim religious one. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs successfully identified evidence in the form of campaigning statements, subsequent advisor statements, and the issuance of EO-1. Id. The court further reasoned that there was insufficient evidence that EO-2 was intended to address national security concerns. Id. at 592.
Int
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the plaintiffs made extensive showings that the governments alleged national security purpose in issuing EO-2 was done so in bad faith and therefore, the Establishment Clause doctrine applied when reviewing its constitutionality. Id. at 593. 
ANALYSIS:
The court determined that to establish consent, the court should "focus on the parties' conduct prior to the removal or retention," but that conduct after removal was also capable of informing whether there was consent at the time of removal. Id. at 176 (emphasis in original). The court reasoned that to determine subjective intent to consent by a preponderance of the evidence was "fact-intensive" and factual and credibility determinations were crucial. Id. The 4th Circuit further reasoned that the district court would be in the best position to make credibility determinations. Id.
CONCLUSION:
The 4th Circuit affirmed on the dispositive basis of the consent defense, and therefore declined to consider whether the record also supports a finding that Petitioner acquiesced in the removal or retention of child. Id.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: Whether a court must apply the rule of lenity to reorder two convictions in the same proceeding so that the minimum sentence of 25 years for a second conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is applied to the conviction ordinarily carrying a longer minimum sentence. Id. at 373.
ANALYSIS:
The court noted that the mandatory minimum sentences for two first convictions of different crimes under § 924(c) are five and ten years, and if there is a second conviction of any crime under § 924(c), the mandatory minimum sentence is 25 years. Id. at 372-73. The court also noted that the United States Supreme Court has defined "conviction" as "the finding of guilty by a judge or jury," but did not address how to determine which conviction is the second conviction to then apply the 25-year mandatory minimum under § 924(c), when a judge has no way of knowing which conviction a jury arrives at first in secret deliberations. Id. at 373. The 5th Circuit joined sister circuits and applied the rule of lenity, which serves as a tool of statutory interpretation and "requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the conviction with the lowest mandatory minimum sentence serves as the first conviction under § 924(c) for purposes of imposing the 25-year enhanced penalty to the second conviction. Id. at 374. ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit discussed an earlier case where plaintiffs sought a stay of execution because the drugs that were going to be used had not been retested, but the court denied the stay because plaintiffs were unable to show that the drug would cause "unnecessarily severe pain that is sure, very likely, and imminent." Id. The 5th Circuit noted that the 8th and 11th Circuits have used a similar test to dispose of method of execution claims. Id. at 498-99. The 5th Circuit agreed specifically with the 8th Circuit, which held that allegations about the potential adverse effects of pentobarbital "were too speculative to survive a motion to dismiss" because all of the risks alleged by plaintiffs were hypothetical situations. Id. at 499.
CONCLUSION:
The 5th Circuit found that since pleading hypothetical risks was insufficient to state a method of execution claim, a claim that additional testing of a drug to find a currently unknown risk cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Id. ANALYSIS: The court noted that the "goal is to determine whether an employee's knowledge may be fairly imputed to the corporation," and that the analysis must involve "developing the evidence, both factual and expert, regarding the employees' job titles, their actual responsibilities, and their overall place within the company." Id. at 374-75.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the proper test for imputing knowledge under the AKA is that "corporations are liable 'only for the knowing violations of those employees whose authority, responsibility, or managerial role within the corporation is such that their knowledge is imputable to the corporation.'" Id. at 375.
QUESTION TWO: Whether the AKA "require[s] proof of a connection between the alleged kickback and a specific instance of favorable treatment." Id. at 371.
ANALYSIS:
The court determined that the line between illegal and legal gift giving becomes difficult to define if a connection between the gift and identifiable treatment is not required. Id. at 378. The court found that kickbacks have the "goal of obtaining or rewarding 'favorable treatment,"" and "requires a pursuit of more than building better customer relations in the abstract." Id. 
CONCLUSION:

ANALYSIS:
The court first noted that the 6th, 9th, and 11th Circuits recently determined that Amendment 794 was only clarifying, and thus retroactively applicable. Id. at 720. The court also noted that neither party pointed to any contrary authority. Id. In order to make its own determination, the court looked to several, non-determinative factors. Id. First, "whether the Commission expressly characterizes the amendment as clarifying," and second, "whether the amendment is intended to address a circuit split, which generally indicates that the amendment is substantive, not clarifying." Id. Third, "whether the amendment is listed . . . as being retroactively applicable," and fourth, "whether the amendment alters the language of the commentary rather than the language of the Guideline itself, which may suggest that it is clarifying." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that Amendment 794 is clarifying and, therefore, could be applied retroactively. Id. at 721.
Vine v. PLS Fin. Servs., 689 F. App'x 800 (5th Cir. May 19, 2017) QUESTION: Whether the defendant "sufficiently implemented the criminal justice system to its own benefit such that its conduct constitutes a substantial invocation of the judicial process . . . ." Id. at 804.
The court reasoned that the unique situation of a civil debt causing both a criminal proceeding and civil action leads the court to "consider the critical role that the Defendant played in the criminal proceedings as the complainant." Id. at 806. The court noted that the complainant, although not a named party in a criminal proceeding, has a personal interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. The court reasoned that the role the complainant plays must be considered. Id. If the complainant is driving the judicial process for its own benefit, then this is a misuse of the criminal justice system. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that when a complainant's allegations are false, and it is clear that the goal is to use the criminal justice system to benefit itself, then such a complaint does not "constitute a substantial invocation of the judicial process." Id. at 805-07. 
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ANALYSIS:
The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits have held that the determination of whether the sadism enhancement applies is an objective inquiry." Id. at 680. The court expressed that there was no "compelling reason to create a circuit split." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that "an objective standard governs the assessment of whether an image portrays sadistic conduct under [18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2G2.1(b)(4)]," and thus, "an image portrays sadistic conduct where it depicts conduct that an objective observer would perceive as causing the victim in the image physical or emotional pain contemporaneously with the image's creation." Id. 679-81. QUESTION: Whether "the district court abused its discretion by finding that its decision was not an intervening change in controlling law and Plaintiffs' strategic decision not to request leave until after adverse judgment was entered did not result in manifest injustice." Id. at 431. that, while aliens facing removal proceedings must be provided a forum to adjudicate adjustment-of-status claims, the statute's text does not require a particular forum. Id. The court further reasoned that § 1245.2(a)(1)(ii) is "not 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'" Id. at 1109.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that § 1245.2(a)(1)(ii) is an "appropriate exercise of the Attorney General's authority to implement the [Immigration and Nationality Act]." Id. QUESTION: Whether this case presents a "tru[e] local controversy," or if the claims "filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against many of the defendants . . . " in this case prior to the current claim are instead considered "copycat class actions," which subsection (ii) of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) seeks to prevent. Id. at 908-09.
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to CAFA, and determined that the plain language of the statute indicates that "[t]he local controversy exception will apply only if no other similar class action was brought against any of the defendants in the instant action during the three years preceding the filing of [the] case." Id. at 909. The 9th Circuit then analyzed the policy considerations, and found that even though CAFA was meant to "eliminate copycat, or near copycat, suits in multiple forums," it was also "enacted to broaden the availability of diversity-jurisdiction for class-action suits." Id. at 910. Finally, the court noted that the cases cited by "both the district court and the plaintiffs [] support a finding that the local controversy exception must apply here." Id.
CONCLUSION: The court stated that because the facts indicate that "multiple class actions ha [d] been filed in the three years preceding the . . . filing of this suit," the local controversy exception did not apply. Id. at 911. QUESTION ONE: Whether a de novo standard of review applies to whether a district court accepted a guilty plea prior to a motion to withdraw an unaccepted plea. Id. at 739-40.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 5th, 8th, and D.C. Circuits have adopted de novo review, and no circuit has adopted abuse-of-discretion review alone. Id. at 739. The court reasoned that an abuse-of-discretion would only allow the appellate court to review the district court's acceptance under the district court's own interpretation. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). In addition, the court pointed out that defendants have an "absolute right to withdraw an unaccepted guilty plea." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that it will evaluate whether a district court accepted a guilty plea under a de novo standard of review. Id. at 739-40.
QUESTION TWO: Whether a district court's conditional acceptance of a guilty plea closes the defendant's window of opportunity to withdraw an unaccepted plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Id.
The court noted that a proper Rule 11 colloquy presumptively forms an acceptance. Id. at 740. The court noted, however, that the 7th and 8th Circuits have held that an explicitly deferred acceptance does not constitute acceptance of a plea. Id. The court noted that referring to an additional step before acceptance suggests deferred acceptance. Id. at 740-41.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that when a district court, on the record, "explicitly defers any acceptance of a plea until a later point in time, the plea has not been accepted" under Rule 11. Id. at 741. ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd Circuit found "an exception to § 6672(a) liability when a responsible person believed that the taxes were in fact being paid, so long as that belief was, in the circumstances, a reasonable one." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court noted that the 5th Circuit adopted a similar holding. Id. The court then noted the First and Seventh Circuits' various factual scenarios for identifying willfulness. Id. Moreover, the 6th Circuit emphasized the need to "balance the government's prerogative to recover that which is owed with limiting liability for that recovery to those who are personally at fault." Id. at 328-29. In support of adopting the 2nd Circuit's exception, the 6th Circuit reasoned that the narrow exception will not permit evasion of liability by corporate officers merely because they compartmentalized responsibilities. Id. at 329. Instead, the court noted that "this exception limits liability to those who, under the circumstances, failed to take reasonable steps to ensure payment of trust-fund taxes after having received notice that those taxes were not being paid." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit adopted the 2nd Circuit's "reasonable cause" exception and held that a responsible person will not be liable under § 6672(a) if it can be established by a preponderance of the evidence that the person reasonably believed that trust-fund taxes were being paid. Id. QUESTION: Whether the venue provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) "precludes enforcement of a forum-selection clause in an employee-benefits plan." Id. at *1.
The court noted the 6th Circuit's earlier analysis of this question, which found that ERISA's venue provision does not explicitly grant the right to bypass a forum-selection clause. Id. at *11-12. The 7th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit's analysis because it was "faithful to the statutory text and not inconsistent with the broader statutory policy of maintaining access to federal court." Id. at *12. The court reasoned that ERISA was built around what is written in the documents, so employers are given significant leeway in the how they design benefits plans. Id. at *13. The 7th Circuit also reasoned that forum-selection clauses are supported by ERISA because they "promote uniformity in plan administration and reduce administration costs." Id. at *15.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that "ERISA's venue provision does not invalidate a forum-selection clause contained in plan documents." Id. at *1. ANALYSIS: The court noted that other circuits have considered the issue and "held such orders interlocutory and not immediately appealable." Id. The 2nd Circuit, recognizing the need to avoid "piecemeal proceedings," determined that "a circuit court can consider any appeal on discovery issues at the same time as the appeal from the judgment in the underlying action." Id. Further, the 9th and 10th Circuits reached a similar conclusion in holding that "appellate review of the order denying discovery will not be foreclosed [because the same circuit will have jurisdiction to ANALYSIS: Initially, the court examined whether Indiana case law supports the proposition that a non-member director can bring a derivative action. Id. at 528. In a past 7th Circuit case, an equitable derivative remedy was recognized, where none was expressly provided for under the predecessor to the Nonprofit Corporation Act. Id. The 7th Circuit distinguished this case on the basis that the plaintiffs were members of the organization, and therefore the case did not even "hint a non-member would have standing to bring an equitable action." Id. at 529. The court distinguished another case because the plaintiff was a shareholder, in addition to a director, who could vindicate a corporation's rights. Id. The court further reasoned that a non-member derivative action would be barred by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which specifically require that plaintiff be a "shareholder or member at the time of the transaction complained of." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Finally, the court noted that the Indiana procedural rules also do not give a plaintiff standing to bring a non-member derivative action, as those rules echo the federal requirement in that a plaintiff must be a "a shareholder or member or holder of an interest." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that a non-member lacked standing to bring a derivative action. Id. at 532. ANALYSIS: The court noted that a taxpayer may challenge the tax liability at a CDP hearing "so long as the taxpayer did not otherwise have the opportunity to dispute such tax liability." Id. at 784 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court offered two possible interpretations of the phrase: "opportunity to dispute." Id. The first interpretation is that the phrase refers to judicial proceedings. Id. at 790. The alternative interpretation is that the phrase encompasses both judicial and administrative proceedings.
Id.
The court adopted the second interpretation as consistent with CDP policy ensuring that a taxpayer will always have some forum, whether judicial or administrative, to challenge a tax before paying it. Id. The court also reasoned that a taxpayer will have "participated meaningfully" through an administrative hearing. Id. at 791.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that a second challenge to tax liability after a prior unsuccessful challenge in an administrative hearing is precluded. Id. at 783. 
The court noted that the 1st Circuit relied on Delaware state court precedent in holding that district court decisions on these motions must be reviewed de novo, while the motions must be considered as one "hybrid summary judgment motion for dismissal." Id. Similarly, the 6th and 9th Circuits regard these motions as a single Rule 56 motion, and review de novo. Id. The 8th Circuit agreed with the 11th Circuit and does not construe the motions as falling under Rule 12(b)(6), nor does it place the motions "into the summary-judgment box." Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that it is not "proper to construe the defendants' motion to terminate as one arising under Rule 56." Id. Instead, Rule 23.1 is proper due to voluntary dismissal being very similar to "a corporate defendant's motion to terminate litigation which it possesses the right to pursue," and "in absence of a better fit" Rule 23.1 is the best option. Id. Whether an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to enforce the coordination of benefits (COB) "terms of its plan is an equitable claim seeking remedies typically available in equity." Id. at 1101.
Dakotas
ANALYSIS:
The court analyzed the historical context of equitable relief and found the sought relief at issue to be "an equitable claim seeking remedies typically available in equity and therefore available under § 502(a)(3)." Id. at 1103. The court reasoned that the judicial ruling sought was one that is "traditionally available in courts of equity by a bill for instructions." Id. The court further reasoned that declaratory judgment is "consistent with the plain language of § 502(a)(3) . . . [and] ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit reasoned that there are various differences between bilateral and class arbitration. Id. The court identified four different factors: "(1) the benefits of arbitration are substantially lessened in a class arbitration proceeding; (2) confidentiality is lost or becomes more difficult; (3) class arbitration brings the bet-the-company stakes of class-action litigation into . . . arbitration without the safety net of multilayered judicial review; (4) class arbitration raises important due process concerns." Id. at 971-72. The court also noted the importance of procedural formalities in class arbitration. Id. Lastly, the court held that both due process and confidentiality concerns are neglected when parties agree to arbitrate class-actions. Id. at 972.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the court should determine whether an arbitration agreement authorizes class arbitration, because of the fundamental differences between bilateral and class arbitration. Id. at 969. ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit first explained that Rule 7 "allows a district court to require an appellant to file a bond or provide other security in any form and amount necessary to ensure payment of costs on appeal." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court then noted that the 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits "generally limit 'costs on appeal' to 'costs that a successful appellate litigant can recover pursuant to a specific rule or statute.'" Id. at 615 (internal citations omitted). The court found this approach sensible and fair, explaining further that " [b] y linking the amount of the bond to the amount the appellee stands to have reimbursed, the rule secures the compensation due to successful appellees while avoiding creating 'an impermissible barrier to appeal' through overly burdensome bonds." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that "'costs on appeal' for Rule 7 purposes include only those costs that the prevailing appellate litigant can recover under a specific rule or statute applicable to the case at hand." Id. 
The court noted that the 6th Circuit held that private settlements should not be allowed because restitution is a sentencing tool required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and cannot be thwarted by private individuals. Id. at 1277. The court also noted that the 5th and 8th Circuits have followed this reasoning, while the 2nd, 6th, and 9th Circuits have held that restitution is still an option even if a private settlement was reached prior to sentencing. Id. The court warned that coercion and collusion may result in agreements to discharge restitution liability if these agreements were permitted. Id. at 1277-78.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that because restitution is a matter of criminal sentencing, private settlement agreements cannot discharge it. Id. at 1277. hether a prospective employer may satisfy the Fair Credit Reporting Act's ("FCRA") disclosure requirements by providing a job applicant with a disclosure that 'a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes' which simultaneously serves as a liability waiver for the prospective employer and others." Id. at 495-96.
The 9th Circuit first examined the text of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). Id. at 500. The statute provides that a consumer report may not be procured without a "clear and conspicuous [written] disclosure [that is within] . . . a document [consisting] solely of the disclosure." Id. at 497 (internal quotations omitted). In its statutory analysis, the court determined that the "meaning of 'solely' is 'alone; singly' or 'entirely; exclusively.'" Id. at 500. Thus, the court found that this section "unambiguously requires a document that 'consists solely of the disclosure.'" Id. The court then held that "subsection (ii) of the provision[, which] provides that the consumer may authorize the procurement of a consumer report on the document containing the disclosure," does not invalidate its decision that the document contain only the disclosure. Id. In making this holding, the court reasoned that the "authorization clause is an express exception to the requirement that the document consist 'solely of the disclosure'" and that the clauses "work in tandem to further" Congress's purpose in enacting the statute. Id. at 501. The court concluded its analysis by holding that the language does not explicitly permit inclusion of a liability waiver, since Congress "told us exactly what it meant when it described the authorization as encompassing only 'the procurement of [a consumer] report.'" Id. at 502. The court opined that this interpretation of the statute is impermissible due to the conflicting meanings of "authorize" and "waive." Id. The court also declined to rule on whether the inclusion of a waiver is permissible if a disclosure is still "'clear and conspicuous,'" limiting its decision to whether "[inclusion of] the waiver violated the statute's 'solely' requirement." Id. at 503.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that § 1681b(b)(2)(A) "unambiguously bars the inclusion of a liability waiver on the same document as a disclosure." Id. at 507. ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit reasoned that "when a statute does not specify a limitations period, federal courts must apply the general statute of limitations that most closely addresses the basis for the plaintiff's claim. Id. The court stated that it previously held that the "limitations period for claims sounding in contract and quasi-contract was governed by the sixyear statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)." Id.
Additionally, the court previously held that the "six-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) provided the limitations period for actions brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ('APA')." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that when a plaintiff alleges that "any agency failed to comply with the ESA's procedural requirements, we apply the general six-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)." Id.
Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, 856 F.3d 696 (9th Cir.
2017) QUESTION:
Whether § 3730(d)(4) of the False Claims Act "contains an independent grant of jurisdiction" allowing a district court to grant a request for attorneys' fees by qui tam plaintiffs where the underlying action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 710.
ANALYSIS:
The court noted that other courts to consider the issue concluded that " § 3730(d)(4) provides an independent grant of jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees even if the underlying action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." Id. The court reasoned that such a bar to requests for attorney's fees due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction would undermine Congress's objective in deterring frivolous litigation. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that " § 3730(d)(4) contains an independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction at least to the extent that a court is able to award attorneys' fees even where the issue is whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction at all." Id. at 711.
Chugach Mgmt. Servs. v. Jetnil, 863 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: "Whether the zone of special danger doctrine can apply to local nationals." Id. at 1174.
The court first looked at the "plain language of the [Defense Base Act (DBA)]," and found that it did not "distinguish between employees sent abroad from their home country and local nationals." Id. Upon reviewing the legislative history of the DBA, the 9th Circuit determined that "Congress implicitly endorsed application of the zone of special danger doctrine to local nationals." Id. Next, the court looked at the pertinent United States Supreme Court case, O'Leary v. BrownPacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951) , and found that the Supreme Court " [did] not distinguish between employees sent abroad from their home country and local nationals working in remote areas as to employees working away from their home country." Jetnil, 863 F.3d at 1175. Finally, the 9th Circuit reasoned that not applying the doctrine to local nationals "would lead to irrational results and contradictory case law." Id.
CONCLUSION:
The 9th Circuit held that "the zone of special danger doctrine can apply to local nationals working in their home countries." Id. at 1177.
Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff must prove "a lack of probable cause to prosecute a defendant [as] an element of a deliberate-fabrication claim" against a police officer. Id. at 801.
ANALYSIS:
The court noted that the 2nd and 3rd Circuits (the only ones to have decided on the issue) determined that a lack of probable cause is not an element of a deliberate-fabrication claim. Id. The court was persuaded by the 3rd Circuit's argument that "no sensible concept of ordered liberty is consistent with law enforcement cooking up its own evidence." Id. (quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2014) ).
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that "a lack of probable cause to prosecute a defendant is not an element of a deliberate-fabrication claim." Peters, 857 F.3d at 801. QUESTION: "Whether putative relief defendants may divest a district court of jurisdiction to proceed against them using summary procedures simply by asserting a claim of entitlement to the disputed funds in their possession." Id. at 999.
The court began its analysis by noting that in order to "assert jurisdiction over-and ultimately obtain disgorgement from-[] relief defendants, the [Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)] [i]s required to demonstrate that [the relief defendants] (1) received ill-gotten funds and (2) do not have a legitimate claim to those funds." Id. at 1004. The relief defendants asserted that "once they advanced a facially colorable claim to the disputed funds, . . . the district court was immediately divested of jurisdiction." Id. The court disagreed, reasoning that if they acquiesced to the defendant's position then "any third party with a custodial claim to the proceeds of securities violations committed by others would be able to defeat relief defendant jurisdiction 'simply by stating a claim of ownership, however specious.'" Id. at 1005.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit joined the 4th Circuit holding that "[r]elief defendants cannot defeat jurisdiction simply by asserting an ownership interest in the disputed funds; rather, . . . they must assert an interest both recognized in law and valid in fact." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). period to the date on which the parent or agency 'knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint,' not the date on which the action occurred." Id. at 941-42. The court further analyzed the text and purpose of the IDEA and the Department of Education's interpretation of the Act, noting the support for the discovery rule.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that "the IDEA's statute of limitations requires courts to apply the discovery rule without limiting redressability to the two-year period that precedes the date when the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint." Id. at 944 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The court first noted that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) held that that the MVRA's enforcement provision overrides an automatic stay on collection action. Id. at 912. The 9th Circuit agreed, explaining that the plain language of the MVRA makes clear that despite any federal laws to the contrary, the government can collect restitution. Id. The court also noted that Congress intended the MVRA to "ensure that criminals pay full restitution to their victims for all damages caused as a result of the crime," regardless of the criminals' economic status. Id. at 913. In addition, the court explained that the MVRA provides for enforcement in accordance with federal practices and procedures to allow the government to collect under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Id. at 913. The court acknowledged that the 2nd and 6th circuits have considered the same question, and both have concluded that the government can collect restitution despite the automatic stay. ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first explained that the California legislature enacted AB 97 as a major reform package "to streamline public education financing and decentralize education governance." Id. at 926. The court explained that "California school districts and county offices of education (COEs) are 'arms of the state' entitled to state sovereign immunity," but that "[s]tate sovereign immunity does not extend to county and municipal governments, unless state law treats them as arms of the state." Id. 926-28. Accordingly, the court examined the following five factors: "(1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, (2) whether the entity performs central government functions, (3) whether the entity may sue or be sued, (4) whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only the name of the state, and (5) the corporate status of the entity." Id. at 928. The court found that the first (which the court noted to be the most important factor), second and fifth factors weighed in favor of "Eleventh Amendment immunity for OCDE," while the third and fourth factors weighed to the opposite. Id. at 928-34. Specifically, regarding the first factor, the court stated "state and local funds are still 'hopelessly intertwined,' and 'any change in the allocation of property tax revenue has a direct effect on the allocation of state funds.'" Id. at 932 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, regarding the second factor, the court reiterated that "California law treats public schooling as a statewide or central governmental function." Id. at 933.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that "California school districts and COEs, including defendant OCDE, remain arms of the state and continue to enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id. at 934.
United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017)
QUESTION: Whether, when the United States files suit, a defendant's counterclaim for injunctive relief constitutes "recoupment" that precludes the United States from enjoying sovereign immunity. Id. at 968.
ANALYSIS:
The 9th Circuit first noted that "when the United States files suit, consent to counterclaims seeking offset or recoupment will be inferred." Id. The court adopted the 10th Circuit's criteria for recoupment claims and stated, "[t]o constitute a claim in recoupment, a defendant's claim must (1) arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's suit; (2) seek relief of the same kind or nature as the plaintiff's suit; and (3) seek an amount not in excess of the plaintiff's claim." Id. (internal citations omitted). The court explained that "the remedy (the 'amount') sought by the United States and by the defendant in recoupment must be monetary." Id. The court acknowledged that while recoupment can affect a monetary award, "[i]t cannot result in an affirmative monetary judgment in favor of the party asserting the claim," and that no case law has applied recoupment "to non-monetary relief such as an injunction." Id. at 968-69.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that "Washington's crossrequest for an injunction thus does not qualify as a claim for recoupment and is barred by sovereign immunity." Id. at 969.
Chan Healthcare Group, PS v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 844 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: Whether an appellate court is permitted to review a district court's order remanding a class action, when the "asserted basis for jurisdiction is a federal question rather than traditional diversity or [Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)] minimal diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 1137.
The court reasoned that the "removal of a case under this section" language in §1453(c) must be read within the limitations established by the CAFA. Id. at 1138. CAFA only grants appellate review to cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. Id. The court also noted that neither of the exceptions under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) applied to federal question cases.
Id. at 1139. The court further reasoned that its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) mirrored that of the 5th, 6th, and 8th Circuits. ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd Circuit has held "witness protection provisions do not provide an independent basis for relief from removal." Id. The 9th Circuit reasoned that the plain language of the UN-CATOC does not support an interpretation that the provisions in Article 24 are self-executing. Id. at 1166. Furthermore, the court concluded executive regulations supported the 9th Circuit's analysis because the regulations implemented the provisions according to a natural reading of Article 24. Id.
CONCLUSION:
The 9th Circuit held that the "UN-CATOC does not provide an independent basis for relief from removal in immigration proceedings." Id.
Brunozzi v. Cable Communs., Inc., 851 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: Whether the term "reported" in an Oregon labor law statute requires an employee to inform an external authority or whether informing a supervisor is sufficient. Id. at 998.
ANALYSIS:
The court first examined the statute's text and context. Id. at 998. In doing so, the court analyzed the dictionary definition and context of "report" and found that the legislature intended to use its ordinary meaning. Id. This finding supports the argument that the term includes both external and internal violation reports. Id. at 999. Next, the court analyzed the legislative history and found that Senators and Representatives sought to encourage reporting among private employees without repercussion so that the employers can fix the problem internally. Id. at 1000.
CONCLUSION:
Considering the text and legislative history of the statute, the 9th Circuit held that the term "reported" meant "a report of information to either an external or internal authority." Id. ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit first pointed to the text of § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i), which provides that a small refinery may be exempt from the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program if participation in this program will cause it to suffer a "disproportionate economic hardship." Id. at *13. The court then noted that the EPA, after interpreting the text, concluded that a small refinery exemption cannot be granted "unless there is a threat to the refinery's long-term viability." Id. at *22. The court then began its analysis of the statute's terms by defining "a 'hardship' [as] something that 'makes one's life hard or difficult -not just something that makes continued existence impossible," while defining "viability . . . [as] the ability to continue or be continued; the state of being financially stable." Id. at *22-23 (internal quotations omitted). The court thus held that the equal treatment of "hardship" and "viability" in an interpretation of the exemption was "transform[ing the] . . . text into something far beyond what Congress plausibly intended." Id. at *24. The court also noted that the statute requires a consideration of the "'disproportionate' impact of the RFS program" on a small refinery, "which inherently requires a comparative evaluation" of that refinery to other refineries. Id. at *25. Thus, under the statute, the court held that an evaluation solely consisting of the refinery seeking exemption is incorrect. Id. The court also opined that, based on "contextual clues in the statutory scheme," if Congress intended for a viability test to be included in the statute, it would have made this intention clear. Id. at *25-26. The court concluded its analysis by distinguishing its case from other cases where the D.C. Circuit and 8th Circuit upheld EPA interpretations where the EPA read viability requirements into the statute. Id. at *26-28. In concluding that those cases were not applicable, the court reasoned that the D.C. and 8th Circuits applied Chevron deference to the EPA interpretations in their decisions and that, in both cases, different arguments about the EPA's statutory interpretations were raised than those the 10th Circuit were considering.
Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit concluded that reading a viability requirement into § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) is an incorrect interpretation of the statute. Id. at *29.
Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: Whether a court is obligated to "decline to reach the merits of an arbitrability dispute regarding . . . " claims arising from contracts in which the parties assent to arbitrate the arbitrability of disputes. Id. at 1290.
ANALYSIS:
The court agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 8th, 9th, 11th and D.C. Circuits' holdings that "if a court finds evidence of clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate arbitrability, it must allow and arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability in the first instance." Id. at 1292. The court found this position to be consistent with the general language from the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1292.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the agreement to arbitrate arbitrability compels the court "to grant the motion to compel arbitration as to all of the claims . . . ." Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis in original). 
The court explained that a conspiracy claim arising under § 2 of the Sherman Act requires at least two participants. Id. at 1235. The court noted that § 1 of the Sherman Act holds that wholly related corporations forms a single-entity and are thus unable to conspire. Id. The court then explained that "[i]t would be anomalous to hold that wholly related corporations constitute a single entity, and so cannot form a conspiracy, for purposes of § 1, but that the same corporations constitute separate entities, and so can form a conspiracy for purposes of § 2." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the single-enterprise theory, which states that wholly related corporations are unable to conspire under § 2 is a viable theory. Id. at 1231. ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit first noted that it had appellate jurisdiction over the final decisions of district courts and that discovery orders are generally not considered final. Id. at *8. The court then acknowledged that, despite this general rule, the 4th, 10th, 9th, 7th, 3rd and 2nd Circuits have held that a district court's § 1782 order pertaining to the use of discovery in a foreign tribunal is instantly appealable. Id. at *8 n. 6. The court specifically addressed the 9th Circuit's decision in In [Vol. 14:45 re 840 140th Ave. NE, 634 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2011) , since it found the 9th Circuit's reasoning to be "particularly . . . sound and persuasive. " Fuhr, No. 15-15355, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7715, at *9-11. The 9th Circuit highlighted that § 1782 orders by district courts are final since these are discovery orders for cases tried in foreign tribunals. Id. at *9 (quoting In re 840 140th Ave., 634 F.3d at 566). Therefore, the 9th Circuit reasoned that § 1782 orders are final because "there is no further case or controversy before the [district] varieties." Id. The court found that the words "'judgment, order, or decree' . . . share, as their common denominator, the notion of a decision carrying some kind of command or adjudicative consequence." Id. In contrast, proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law do not constitute a judicial decision with legal effect. Id. at 1321-22. Since the bankruptcy courts' "ability to fully hear and determine cases does not extend to noncore proceedings," only the district court is vested with adjudicatory authority, absent consent. Id at 1322.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that § 158(d)(2)(A) does not give an appellate court jurisdiction to consider, "on a direct certified appeal, the merits of an unauthorized bankruptcy court order entered without consent in a related non-core proceeding, unless it has first been reviewed by the district court as a report with proposed findings of fact and/or conclusions of law." Id.
Brown Jordan Int'l, Inc. v. Carmicle, 846 F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: Whether a claimed "loss," pursuant to § 1030(e)(11) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, must "stem from an 'interruption of service' to be compensable." Id. at 1179.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that "the statutory definition includes two separate types of loss: (1) reasonable costs incurred in connection with such activities as responding to a violation, assessing the damage done, and restoring the affected data, program system, or information to its condition prior to the violation; and (2) any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service." Id. at 1174. The court reasoned that a "'[l]oss' includes the direct costs of responding to the violation in the first portion of the definition, and consequential damages resulting from interruption of service in the second." Id. The court further reasoned that, because the statute is constructed disjunctively, the first type of loss does not require an "interruption of service." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a "loss" need not arise as a result of an "interruption of service" to be compensable under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Id. at 1179.
United States v. Poignant, 676 F. App'x 832 (11th Cir. 2017) QUESTION: Whether the district court's re-imposition of a prohibition on possessing visual depictions of adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct as a condition of supervised release for a defendant convicted of enticement of a minor was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 835.
The court recognized that a district court may order special conditions of supervised release so long as each condition: (1) is reasonably related to the nature of the circumstances of the offense; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary and (3) is consistent with the pertinent policies of the Sentencing Commission. Id. at 834. The court reasoned that the prohibition on viewing sexually explicit visuals of adults was reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense because the defendant's internet activity led him to commit the offense for which he was convicted. Id. at 836. The court further reasoned that the defendant was not deprived of liberty to a greater extent than necessary because the supervised release condition was not too broad or vague that a court could not determine if it was reasonably related to sentencing factors. Id. at 834-36.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion where the special condition on supervised release was reasonably related to the sentencing factors and did not impinge on defendant's rights. Id. at 836. ANALYSIS: The court noted the 10th Circuit's position that "[t]he rule against claim-splitting requires a plaintiff to assert all of its causes of action arising from a common set of facts in one lawsuit," and further noted that the 2nd Circuit had adopted a similar position. Id. at 841 (internal citations omitted). The court stated that the 10th Circuit's test for claim-splitting "is not whether there is finality of judgment, but whether the first suit, assuming it were final, would preclude the second suit." Id. (internal citations omitted). The court agreed that the 10th Circuit's test "makes sense, given that the claim-splitting rule exists to allow district courts to manage their docket and dispense with duplicative litigation." Id. (internal citations omitted). The court also acknowledged the 5th Circuit's use of the "transactional test," in which " . . . [t] . . a district court may extinguish a nonparty's pre-existing rights to property under the administration of the equity receivership if that non-party fails to comply with the court's orders regarding filing of proofs of claim." Id. at 1341.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that "a district court has broad powers and wide discretion to determine relief in an equity receivership." Id. at 1343-44. The court noted that "a receiver appointed by a federal court takes property subject to all liens, priorities, or privileges existing or accruing under the laws of the state," but beyond this rule, there is no authority of the district court to extinguish a secured creditor's pre-existing rights to property. Id. at 1344. The court further determined that the district court cannot order a secured creditor to file proof of claim, or determine that a secured creditor loses its secured state-law property right that existed prior to a receiver being appointed. Id. at 1345.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the district court may not extinguish a non-party's pre-existing rights to property. Id. at 1341. ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit explained that the "'categorical approach' . . . considers only the elements of the offense of conviction." Id. at 1329. The court noted that the statute "uses language that the [United States Supreme Court] has previously said suggests consideration of the underlying conduct." Id. at 1334. The court specifically referenced the Supreme Court's focus on the word "elements" when it ultimately adopted the categorical approach for another statute. Id. The 11th Circuit distinguished its case, however, because the statute at issue "does not define an 'offense against property' by referring to the 'element[s]' of the offense," but rather, "it describes an 'offense against property' by reference to how it was 'committed'-specifically, it specifies that an 'offense against property' 'include[s] any offense committed by fraud or deceit.'" Id. (internal citations omitted). The court further noted that a number of its sister circuits "have focused on the conduct underlying the offense of conviction instead of the elements of the crime." Id. at 1335 (internal citations omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit "decline [d] to apply the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction qualifies as an 'offense against property' under § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii)." Id. ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that foreign "states," "nations," "governments," or "sovereigns" are not covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 49-50. The court also noted that the 2nd Circuit recently determined that only "separate sovereigns, recognized by the United States government as sovereigns, are foreign states left unprotected by the Due Process Clause." Id.
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit in holding that non-sovereign foreign governments are "persons" under the Fifth Amendment, but posited that "while the [2nd] Circuit uses political recognition as the sole definition of sovereignty for due-process purposes, we leave open whether additional considerations could be relevant in future cases." Id. ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that "[t]he local CPI approach gives the most effect to the statutory text." Id. The court explained, "EAJA expressly defines recoverable attorney fees in terms of 'prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,'" and further explained that the EAJA " . . . states in relevant part that attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in 'the cost of living' justifies a higher fee." Id. (internal citations omitted). The court additionally noted that "[t]hese two factorsmarket rates, and the cost of living-strike us as being inherently local in nature. We thus believe that using the market rate and the cost of living actually experienced by an EAJA applicant's attorney is most consistent with EAJA's plain language." Id. The court noted that "[t]he local CPI approach also better fulfills the purposes underpinning EAJA. Congress passed EAJA to (1) ensure adequate representation for those needing to vindicate their rights against the government and (2) minimize the cost of this redress to taxpayers." Id. Lastly, the court reasoned that the "local CPI approach reduces taxpayer exposure by preventing windfalls to attorneys whose costs of living lie below the national average." Id. at 1249-50.
Citizens for
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that "the Veterans Court did not err in ruling that the local CPI approach represented the correct method of calculating the adjustment in [the] attorney's hourly rate." Id. at 1249.
